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Abstract: In this paper I examine the relationship between Pareto-optimality and group size in 
linear  public  goods  games  or  experiments.  In  particular,  I  use  the  standard  setting  of 
homogeneous linear public goods experiments and apply a recently developed tool to identify 
all  Pareto-optimal  allocations  in  such  settings.  It  turns  out  that  under  any  conceivable 
circumstances,  ceteris  paribus,  small  groups  have  a  higher  Pareto-ratio  (Pareto-optimal 
allocations  over  total  allocations)  than  large  groups.  Hence,  if  Pareto-optimality  of  an 
allocation is a property that makes such allocations acceptable and maintainable, small groups 
will find is easier to provide Pareto-optimal amounts of a public good than large groups. This 
is a novel reasoning for Mancur Olson’s claim, in particular, with respect to what he has 
termed inclusive goods and inclusive groups.   
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Introduction 
In his seminal contribution, Mancur Olson (1971, p. 35) concludes that “the larger the group, 
the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good”.  To put this 
differently,  “sufficiently  small  groups  can  provide  themselves  with  some  amount  of  a 
collective good through the voluntary and rational action of one or more of their members 
[and]  in  this  they  are  distinguished  from  really  large  groups”  (Olson  1971,  pp.  32-33). 
Olson’s conclusion is essentially based on cost and benefit considerations. He shows, both 
analytically and graphically, that the collective good may be provided to some extent, if “the 
gain to the individual exceeds the total costs of providing the collective good to the group” 
(Olson 1971, p. 33). In this context it is worth emphasizing that the term ‘gain’ should be 
interpreted widely and may not only encompass incentives such as monetary and social ones, 
but also erotic, psychological, moral, etc. incentives (see Olson 1971, 61, fn. 17). 
The main purpose of the present paper is to reconfirm Olson’s statement by using a novel 
alternative reasoning for his claim that small groups may find it easier to provide themselves 
with an optimal amount of collective or public goods than large groups do. Moreover, the 
analysis is conducted within the framework of linear public goods games or experiments, 
which  emerged  only  after  Olson’s  work  as  a  popular  tool  for  analyzing  human  subject 
behavior with respect to providing public goods. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section a typical linear public goods game is 
introduced and analyzed with respect to the purpose of this paper. Based on this analysis, I 
then discuss the connection between Pareto-optimality and group size in section three and 
derive a novel reasoning for Olson’s statement. The final section summarizes and concludes.  
 
 
Linear Public Goods Games 
The literature on linear public goods games has been surveyed by Chaudhuri (2011), Zelmer 
(2003), and Ledyard (1995), among others. In a generalized homogenous standard setting, 
each  human  subject  in  the  experiment  faces  an  identical  linear  payoff  function  of  the 
following form, 
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where the index i denotes the i-th subject, with i = 1, …, s, Ui denotes individual payoff, Bi 
represents the given individual endowment or budget in each round, xi denotes individual 
contribution to the public good, (Bi – xi) is the individual quantity of the private good and 
individual  contributions  to  the  public  good  summarized  over  all  s  subjects  represent  the 
quantity of the public good, which is consumed in a nonrival manner by all subjects and α and 
β are parameters of the model. Hence, in terms of Olson linear public goods games typically 
deal with inclusive goods and inclusive groups.  
Moreover,  Ui,  Bi  and  xi  are  usually  measured  in  terms  of  tokens  and  right  after  the 
experiment  subjects  receive  their  payoff  in  local  cash  (e.g.  Euro,  Dollar)  by  applying  a 
predetermined  exchange  rate  between  tokens  and  local  cash.  Also,  the  group  size  s  and 
parameters  α  and  β  are  selected  by  the  experimenter  in  a  way  that  a  prisoner’s  dilemma 
situation arises, which is the case whenever the following condition holds:  
 
  1/s < MPCR < 1                  (2) 
 
where MPCR is the marginal per capita return of a contribution to the public good (e.g. see 
Croson 2007, p. 200). In general, the MPCR is the marginal incentive to contribute to the 
public good (e.g. see Ledyard 1995, p. 149). In the case of equation (1) the MPCR, therefore, 
amounts to: β/α. 
At this point it is worth emphasizing that the following analysis holds for any parameter set 
that  simultaneously  fits  equations  (1)  and  (2),  and  where  subjects  take  their  decisions 
voluntarily, cannot communicate with each other and spend their budgets in a discrete manner 
(see Hokamp and Pickhardt 2011, for further details). However, these conditions prevail in 
any standard linear public goods experiment. For illustrative purposes alone assume that Bi = 
2 for all i, α = 1, b = 0.4, s = 3 and that subjects must spend their budgets token by token as in 
most  linear  public  goods  experiments.  Hence,  in  the  present  case,  subjects  may  choose 
between  three  alternatives:  contributing  their  two  tokens  to  the  public  good  and  keeping 
nothing as their private good, which is denoted as full-contribution (FC), contributing one 
token to the public good and keeping the other one as their private good, which is denoted as 
partial contribution (PC) or contributing nothing to the public good and keeping both tokens 
as their private good, which is denoted as non-contribution (NC). 
Following  Pickhardt  (2005,  p.  142;  2003,  p.  188),  Table  1  shows  the  set  of  feasible 
allocations,  subject  to  equation  (1)  and  the  parameter  set.  In  particular,  in  Table  1  Allo. 
denotes  the  allocation,  sFC  (sPC,  sNC)  denotes  the  number  of  full-contributors  (partial-4 
 
contributors,  non-contributors),  UFC  (UPC,  UNC)  denotes  the  individual  payoff  of  a  full-
contributor  (partial-contributor,  non-contributor),  sFC×UFC  (sFC×UFC,  sFC×UFC)  denotes  the 
payoff  of  the  group  of  full-contributors  (partial-contributors,  non-contributors)  which  for 
brevity is not displayed, X (= ∑i xi) denotes the total quantity of the public good, W denotes 
the group payoff or welfare level and CA denotes the number of clone allocations.  
 
Table 1: Set of Feasible Allocations with n = 3 
Allo.  sFC×UFC  sPC×UPC  sNC×UNC  X  W  CA 
1  –  –  3×2  0  6  0 
2  –  1×1.4  2×2.4  1  6.2  2 
3  1×0.8  –  2×2.8  2  6.4  2 
4  –  2×1.8  1×2.8  2  6.4  2 
5  1×1.2  1×2.2  1×3.2  3  6.6  5 
6  –  3×2.2  –  3  6.6  0 
7  1×1.6  2×2.6  –  4  6.8  2 
8  2×1.6  –  1×3.6  4  6.8  2 
9  2×2  1×3  –  5  7  2 
10  3×2.4  –  –  6  7.2  0 
Note:  Allo.  denotes  the  allocation,  sFC  (sPC,  sNC)  denotes  the  number  of  full-contributors 
(partial-contributors, non-contributors), UFC (UPC, UNC) denotes the individual payoff of a 
full-contributor (partial-contributor, non-contributor), sFC×UFC (sFC×UFC, sFC×UFC) denotes 
the payoff of the group of full-contributors (partial-contributors, non-contributors) which for 
brevity is not displayed, X (= ∑i xi) denotes the total quantity of the public good, W denotes 
the group payoff or welfare level and CA denotes the number of clone allocations. Figures set 
in bold denote a Pareto-optimal allocation.  
 
For example, consider allocation three (Allo. 3) of Table 1. In this case one subject contributes 
his or her full budget to the public good (xi = 2; alternative FC) and receives an individual 
payoff of 0.8 tokens, whereas the two remaining subjects both contribute nothing to the public 
good (xi = 0; alternative NC) and receive an individual payoff of 2.8 tokens each. Likewise, in 
allocation six all three subjects choose alternative PC and receive an individual payoff of 2.2 
tokens each, whereas in allocation ten they all choose alternative FC and get an individual 
payoff of 2.4 tokens each. Moreover, due to the prevailing prisoner dilemma deviation from 
contributing to the public good is always beneficial. For example, if allocation ten prevails a 
subject that switches ceteris paribus from alternative FC to NC will increase its individual 
payoff from 2.4 to 3.6 tokens in allocation eight. Hence, rational and selfish, individual payoff 
maximizing  subjects  will  always  choose  not  to  contribute  to  the  public  good  (NC)  and 
allocation  one  represents  the  non-cooperative  Nash-equilibrium.  However,  Table  1  also 5 
 
illustrates that pure altruists have an incentive to always contribute their entire endowment 
(FC) because each token contributed to the public good (X) increases group payoff or welfare 
(W) by 0.2 tokens. 
With respect to the purpose of the present paper, another interesting feature of Table 1 is 
that it allows for identifying the entire set of Pareto-optimal allocations as a subset of the total 
number of allocations.  In fact, Pareto-optimal allocations are denoted in bold in Table 1, 
whereas Pareto-inferior  allocations are not. For example, allocation five is Pareto-optimal 
because there is no other allocation in the set of feasible allocations that makes at least one 
subject better off without making any other subject worse off. In contrast, if we consider an 
allocation that is not Pareto-optimal, such as allocation six, then there is at least one allocation 
in the set of feasible allocations that allows one subject to be better off, without making any 
other subject worse off, here allocation ten where all three subjects are better off (see Table 
1).  
Finally, it is worth noting that allocations one to ten in Table 1 represent the set of Pareto-
distinguishable allocations. For each of these allocations the permutations can be calculated 
from, s! / (sFC! sPC! sNC!), see Hokamp and Pickhardt (2011). In Table 1 column CA denotes 
the  number  of  clone  allocations,  which  is  the  permutation  for  this  allocation  minus  one 
arbitrarily selected master allocation. The master allocation is shown in Table 1 as the Pareto-
distinguishable allocation and the number of clone allocations then indicates that this master 
allocation has a number of Pareto-non-distinguishable clone allocations. The total number of 
allocations can be calculated by adding all master allocations plus their clone allocations, 
here: 10 + 17 = 27, according to Table 1. The total number of Pareto-optimal allocations is 
calculated by adding the allocations denoted in bold in the same manner, which gives: 6 + 13 
= 19. This allows for calculating what Hokamp and Pickhardt (2011) call the Pareto-ratio, e.g. 
the number of Pareto-optimal allocations over the number of allocations, here: 19/27 ≈ 0.70. 
In fact, we now have discussed linear public goods games in sufficient detail to move on to 
analyzing the relationship between Pareto-optimality and group size in the following section.  
 
Pareto-optimality and Group Size 
To proceed, in a first step group size is increased ceteris paribus from three to five subjects. 
Again, this size is used for simplicity alone and with a view to keep the Table 2 readable. 
Inspection of Table 2 and a comparison with Table 1 reveals the following: i) the number of 
Pareto-distinguishable allocations is now 21 instead of 10, ii) the total number of allocations 6 
 
is up to 21 + 222 = 243, iii) the number of Pareto-optimal allocations is up to 6 + 45 = 51, iv) 
and the Pareto-ratio is down to 51/243 ≈ 0.21.  
 
Table 2: Set of Feasible Allocations with s = 5 
Allo.  sFC×UFC  sPC×UPC  sNC×UNC  X  W  CA 
1  –  –  5×2  0  10  0 
2  –  1×1.4  4×2.4  1  11  4 
3  –  2×1.8  3×2.8  2  12  9 
4  1×0.8  –  4×2.8  2  12  4 
5  –  3×2.2  2×3.2  3  13  9 
6  1×1.2  1×2.2  3×3.2  3  13  19 
7  –  4×2.6  1×3.6  4  14  4 
8  1×1.6  2×2.6  2×3.6  4  14  29 
9  2×1.6  –  3×3.6  4  14  9 
10  –  5×3  –  5  15  0 
11  1×2  3×3  1×4  5  15  19 
12  2×2  1×3  2×4  5  15  29 
13  1×2.4  4×3.4  –  6  16  4 
14  2×2.4  2×3.4  1×4.4  6  16  29 
15  3×2.4  –  2×4.4  6  16  9 
16  2×2.8  3×3.8  –  7  17  9 
17  3×2.8  1×3.8  1×4.8  7  17  19 
18  3×3.2  2×4.2  –  8  18  9 
19  4×3.2  –  1×5.2  8  18  4 
20  4×3.6  1×4.6  –  9  19  4 
21  5×4  –  –  10  20  0 
Note:  Allo.  denotes  the  allocation,  sFC  (sPC,  sNC)  denotes  the  number  of  full-contributors 
(partial-contributors, non-contributors), UFC (UPC, UNC) denotes the individual payoff of a 
full-contributor (partial-contributor, non-contributor), sFC×UFC (sFC×UFC, sFC×UFC) denotes 
the payoff of the group of full-contributors (partial-contributors, non-contributors) which for 
brevity is not displayed, X denotes the quantity of the public good, W denotes the group payoff 
or welfare level and CA denotes the number of clone allocations. Figures set in bold denote a 
Pareto-optimal allocation.  
 
In fact, a closer inspection of Tables 1 and 2 shows the driving force behind the drop of the 
Pareto-ratio.  Given  the  parameter  values  and  equations  (1)  and  (2),  a  Pareto-optimal 
allocation  strictly  requires  that  no  more  than  two  subjects  choose  a  deviation  from  the 
alternative full contribution, sFC. Put differently, the sum of the number of subjects having 
chosen the alternatives partial contribution, sPC, and/or non-contribution, sNC, must not exceed 
two, that is, sPC + sNC ≤ 2. Inspection of Table 1 and 2 shows that this condition is met by all 7 
 
Pareto-optimal allocations, which implies that this condition is independent from the group 
size s. However, since the group size must necessarily meet the condition, s = sFC + sPC + sNC, 
it immediately follows that an increase or decrease in the group size, s, requires an identical 
increase or decrease of the number of full contributors, sFC. Thus, in Table 1, with s = 3, at 
least one full contributor is required for a Pareto-optimal allocation, sFC ³ 1, whereas in Table 
2, with s = 5, at least three full contributors are required for a Pareto-optimal allocation, sFC ³ 
3. Again, inspection of Tables 1 and 2 confirms this result. Moreover, at this point it is worth 
noting that Hokamp and Pickhardt (2011) have derived and proved these conditions for the 
general case. Using their result four, Table 3 shows relevant values for higher group sizes.  
 
Table 3: Group Size, Pareto-ratio and Full Contributors 
Group Size  3  5  10  50  75  100 



















sPC + sNC  ≤2  ≤2  ≤2  ≤2  ≤2  ≤2 
sFC  ³1  ³3  ³8  ³48  ³73  ³98 
Note:  sFC  (sPC,  sNC)  denotes  the  number  of  full-contributors  (partial-contributors,  non-
contributors). 
 
To summarize, Tables 1 through 3 demonstrate that the share of Pareto-optimal allocations 
among the overall set of feasible allocations is ceteris paribus much higher in small groups 
than in large groups. Moreover, other things being equal, in small groups a much lower share 
of the group members has to fully contribute to reach a Pareto-optimal allocation than in large 
groups. In fact, if the group size gets very large, almost all group members have to fully 
contribute to the public good to reach a Pareto-optimal allocation.  
To put this differently, in small groups, the share of subjects, who are motivated according 
to Olson by an individual gain (of social, erotic, psychological, or moral nature) that exceeds 
the total costs of providing the collective good to the group, can be substantially smaller than 
in large groups.
1 As there is no good reason to assume that the distribution of these behavioral 
(Olson) types in a group depends on the group size, small groups have a much larger chance 
                                                 
1 Note that monetary incentives are excluded here because this would imply that for one or more group members 
the MPCR is higher than one, which would violate condition (2). However, Brandts and Schram (2001) and 
others did run such experiments. In contrast, motivations of a social, erotic, psychological, or moral nature are 
compatible with condition (2) and numerous experiments have shown that human subjects indeed contribute to 
public goods due to these and similar motivations. 8 
 
to reach a Pareto-optimal provision level of public goods because they need a substantially 
lower share of group members who show such an Olson-type behavior pattern.  
Hence, on purely technical grounds, small groups will find it much easier to agree on a 
Pareto-optimal provision of public goods. To this extent, the preceding analysis represents a 
novel reasoning for Mancur Olson’s (1971, p. 35) claim that “the larger the group, the farther 




By using the popular framework of linear public goods games and a new tool for identifying 
all Pareto-optimal allocations in such games, this note has shown that ceteris paribus there is 
a negative relation between the Pareto-ratio and the group size in these games. This finding 
supports the claim of Mancur Olson as noted above.  
Further,  it  must  be  emphasized  that  the  analysis  explicitly  applies  to  what  Olson  has 
termed  inclusive  goods  and  inclusive  groups.  Therefore,  arguments  put  forward  by  early 
critics  of  Olson`s  analysis,  for  example  by  Chamberlin  (1974,  p.  712),  who  argued  that 
Olson’s analysis would not hold for inclusive goods and groups, but just for exclusive ones, 
may be clearly rejected. 
Finally, by making use of the tools presented here and in Hokamp and Pickhardt (2011), it 
would now be possible to experimentally test whether human subjects do find it easier to 
agree on a Pareto-optimal allocation in linear public goods games, if they have the relevant 
information about the Pareto-optimality of the prevailing allocation. Thus, testing Olson’s 
assertion with human subjects in laboratory environments seems to be a promising task for 
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